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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal on transfer from the 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED BY UTA'S CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting Serratos an extension 
of time in the absence of a showing of good cause or extraordinary circumstances 
establishing excusable neglect. The trial court's determination of excusable neglect for 
failure to timely commence an appeal is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Prowswood? Inc. 
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah 1984). This issue was preserved in 
UTA's memorandum in opposition to Serratos3 motion to extend time to appeal. (R. 254-
268) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY SERRATOS3 APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court correcdy determined as a matter of law that Serratos5 
claims against UTA were barred by their failure to comply with the notice of claim 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The trial court's application of the 
Governmental Immunity Act is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. Utah 
Dept. of Transp.? 1999 Utah Ct. App. 227 UH 11-12, 986 P.2d 752, 757. This issue was 
preserved in UTA's memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 13-27) 
2. Whether the trial court correctly determined that failure to satisfy the notice 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act precludes application of the savings 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 to Serratos' claims. The trial court's application 
of the statutory savings provisions is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Hebertson 
v. Bank One Utah. N.A., 1999 Utah Ct. App. 342 1111 6-7, 995 P.2d 7, 9. This issue was 
preserved in UTA's combined reply/opposition memorandum. (R. 141-143) 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Rule 4(a). Utah R.App.P.: 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial 
court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 
filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of 
the judgment or order appealed from. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1965. as amended 1991): 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim 
were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an 
action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and 
without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply 
to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may 
extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially 
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1965, as amended 1987): 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employees for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed 
with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-
30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. <S 78-12-40: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he 
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a 
new action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury action arising from a collision between a pickup truck and a 
UTA bus on December 17,1996. On December 8,1997, Serratos served a notice of claim 
on Steven H. Cain, Risk Manager for UTA and David C. Pitcher, Claims Adjuster for 
UTA. Neither of these gentlemen is a member of UTA's Board of Directors. Notice was 
i 
also served on the Attorney General. No notice of claim was ever served on the UTA Board 
of Directors, as required by Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 13. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
After Serratos commenced their litigation, UTA moved for summary judgment on 
the grounds that Serratos had failed to comply with the provisions of the Governmental 
Immunity Act for service of their notice of claim. Serratos filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment on the notice of claim issue and for a determination that they were 
permitted one additional year under the savings provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 
to correctly serve a notice of claim on UTA's Board of Directors and to refile their 
complaint. 
On August 5,1999, the trial court granted UTA's motion and denied Serratos5 
cross-motion. The court entered an Order of Dismissal on August 26, 1999. On 
August 31,1999, counsel for UTA mailed Serratos5 counsel a Rule 58A Notice of Entry of 
Judgment and a copy of the Order of Dismissal. 
On October 1,1999, six days after the time for filing a notice of appeal had expired, 
Serratos filed a motion to extend the time to appeal. Without oral argument or entry of any 
findings in support of such an extension, the trial court granted Serratos5 motion by minute 
entry dated October 27,1999, and entered an order extending the time to appeal on 
November 8,1999. Serratos filed their notice of appeal with the trial court on 
November 2,1999. UTA filed a timely notice of a cross-appeal on November 15,1999. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 17,1996, Cristobal Serrato was driving his pickup truck 
with his wife Elida Serrato as a passenger when the truck collided with a UTA bus driven 
by Lance K. Sargent. The Serratos were both injured in the accident. 
On December 8,1997, the Serratos served Steven H. Cain, Risk Manager for UTA 
and David C. Pitcher, Claims Adjuster for UTA with a Notice of Claim for Injury dated 
December 2,1997. (R. 179, copy attached as Addendum A-l.) The notice indicates that 
Attorney General Jan Graham may also have been served. (R. 179) No notice of claim was 
ever served on the UTA Board of Directors. 
Steven H. Cain is the Risk Manager for UTA and reports to UTA's director of 
finance. He is not an officer of UTA or a member or employee of the Board of Directors. 
He is not a registered agent of UTA. He was not hired by the Board of Directors and does 
not report to the Board or routinely attend Board meetings. He does not keep minutes or 
records for the Board or provide notice of Board meetings. (R. 24-25, copy of Affidavit of 
Steven H. Cain is attached as Addendum A-2.) 
Mr. Cain's immediate supervisor is Kenneth D. Montague, Jr., the Director of 
Finance. Mr. Montague in turn reports to the General Manager, John M. Inglish, who in 
turn reports to the Board of Directors. (R. 146) 
David C. Pitcher is the claims adjuster for UTA and reports to Steven H. Cain, Risk 
Manager. He is not an officer of UTA or a member or employee of the Board of Directors. 
He is not a registered agent of UTA. He was not hired by the Board, does not report to 
tiie Board and does not routinely attend Board meetings. He does not keep minutes or 
records for the Board or provide notice of Board meetings. (R. 26-27, copy of Affidavit of 
David C. Pitcher is attached as Addendum A-3.) 
Serratos commenced their action in the Third District Court by filing a complaint on 
April 16,1998 (R. 1-4) and serving a summons on the UTA Board of Directors, Jim Clark, 
Chairman, on April 27,1998. (R. 5-7) On July 21,1998, UTA filed a motion for 
summary judgment based upon the Serratos5 failure to comply with the notice of claim 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 13. 
(R. 13-27) On January 19,1999, Serratos filed a cross-motion for summary judgment 
arguing, among other things, that even if the trial court determined the notice of claim to 
be improperly served that they were entided under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 to correct ( 
the deficiency by serving a new notice and refiling their action. (R. 84-91) The trial court 
entered a minute entry on August 5,1999, granting UTA's motion and denying the 
Serratos3 motion. (R. 246-48) A Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal was entered 
on August 26,1999. (R.249-51) 
On August 31,1999, counsel for UTA mailed a Rule 58A Notice of Entry of 
Judgment and a copy of the order to counsel for the Serratos which identified August 26 as 
the date of entry of the order. (R. 252-53, copy attached as Addendum A-4.) * 
September 25, the last day on which to file a notice of appeal, passed without a notice being 
filed. Six days later, on October 1,1999, the Serratos filed with the trial court a motion to ^ 
extend the time to appeal. (R. 269-70) Without oral argument or entry of any supporting 
findings, the trial court granted Serratos3 motion by minute entry dated October 27,1999. 
(R. 294-95) The court entered an order extending the time to appeal, containing no 
findings or justification for the order, on November 8,1999. (R. 301-02, copy attached as 
Addendum A-5.) The Serratos filed their notice of appeal with the trial court on 
November 2,1999. (R. 296-98) UTA filed a timely notice of cross-appeal on 
November 15,1999. (R. 306-307) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Serratos had adequate and timely notice of the entry of a final order and 
judgment against them disposing of all claims as to all parties and that the time for filing 
their notice of appeal had begun to run. They failed to file within the requisite 30-day 
period. Six days later, they belatedly applied to the trial court for an extension of time to 
appeal, the granting of which was a reversible abuse of discretion by the trial court. Because 
Serratos failed to timely commence their appeal, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain 
the appeal and the trial court had no authority to restore that jurisdiction. The appeal must 
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Even if the Court finds jurisdiction to conduct the appeal in this matter, the 
judgment of the trial court must be affirmed because Serratos failed to comply with the 
mandatory service of notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
An individual's right to sue a governmental entity is a statutorily created right subject 
to strict construction of the governing statutory provisions. The Utah courts have, except 
in very unique circumstances, consistently rejected equitable exceptions to the governmental 
immunity requirements, including the notice of claim provisions. The notice of claim at 
issue here was drafted and filed by qualified legal counsel, not by an unsophisticated plaintiff 
acting pro se. Even to the extent that any limited equitable exceptions have been 
recognized, it is not appropriate to extend any such exceptions to one who is qualified to 
research, understand and comply with the notice of claim requirements. Moreover, the 
notice of claim provisions in the Governmental Immunity Act function as a statute of 
limitations and are not simply procedural in nature. Failure to comply with these 
requirements acts as a bar to a claim, not just a curable procedural defect. 
The trial court correcdy determined that the Serratos' claims are barred by their 
failure to comply with the notice requirements. Its entry of summary judgment should be 
affirmed. { 
Because the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act function as a 
statute of limitation which bars a plaintiffs claims for failure to comply, the provisions of 
the Utah savings statute do not permit Serratos to cure this fatal jurisdictional defect by 
filing a new notice of claim and recommencing this action. The trial court therefore 
{ 
properly dismissed their claims with prejudice. This Court should therefore affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
i 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE 
SERRATOS AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL IN THE ABSENCE 
OF AN ADEQUATE SHOWING SUPPORTING A FINDING OF GOOD 
CAUSE OR EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES ESTABLISHING 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
The Serratos' counsel, an experienced litigator, knew that the trial court had decided 
to grant summary judgment against his clients shortly after the minute entry had been made 
on August 5,1999, and a copy mailed to him. By September 1st or 2nd, he had in his 
possession a Rule 58A Notice of Entry of Judgment which expressly identified August 26 as 
the date of entry of judgment and a copy of the dated order entered by the trial court. He 
nonetheless failed to file a timely notice of appeal with the trial court before the allotted 30 
days for allowing such an appeal had run. Six days later he applied to the trial court for an 
extension of time in which to appeal. Without a finding of good cause or excusable neglect, 
the trial court granted the requested extension. In doing so, the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
The plain and unambiguous language of Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for 30 days within which to prepare and file a notice of appeal. 
Appeal From Final Judgment and Order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate 
court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. . . . 
n 
Rule 4(a), Utah R.App.P. (emphasis added). It is the date of entry which controls and not 
the point at which a party is notified of the entry of judgment. The service of a copy of the 
signed judgment, whether timely made or not, does not affect the 30-day filing deadline. 
Notice of Signing or Entry of Judgment. A copy of the signed 
judgment shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in the 
manner provided in Rule 5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is 
not affected by the requirement of this provision. 
Rule 58A(d), Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). 
cTt is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is a 
jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the appeal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah 1984). See also Albretson v. Tudd, 709 P.2d 347, 
348 (Utah 1985) (court raised timeliness issue sua sponte and dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction); Estate of Ratliff In re? 431 P.2d 571, 573 (Utah 1967) (court had no 
jurisdiction where notice of appeal filed 7 days late). Only if a party demonstrates excusable 
neglect or good cause under Rule 4(e) may a trial court extend the time for initiating an 
appeal after the 30-day period has run. Under that rule, neglect is excusable only where the 
circumstances are unique or extraordinary. Pontarelli v. Stone. 930 R2d 104, 111 (1st Cir. 
1991). ccWhen the question of'excusable neglect3 arises in a jurisdictional context as 
opposed to a non-jurisdictional context, the standard contemplated thereby is necessarily a 
strict one.33 Prowswood 676 P.2d at 959 (citations omitted, emphasis added). This strict 
standard is important to avoid removing the consequences from simple failure to file a 
timely notice of appeal. See In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.. 769 R2d 911, 917 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (cca loose interpretation of'excusable neglect5 would convert the 30-day period 
in 
for appeal provided in FRAP 4(a) into a 60-day one—a result clearly not intended by the 
Rule's framers33). 
The rule does not apply in the absence of facts supporting a judicial finding that such 
unique or extraordinary circumstances are present. Prowswood 676 P.2d at 960, citing 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Conner. 382 F.2d 13,16-17 (10th Cir. 1967). "Inadvertence or 
mistake of counsel does not constitute the type of unique or extraordinary circumstances 
contemplated by this strict standard." Prowswood 676 P.2d at 960.1 Excusable neglect 
under Rule 4 "refers to the missing of a deadline as a result of such things as 
misrepresentations by judicial officers, lost mail, and plausible misinterpretations of 
ambiguous rules." Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 76 F.3d 132,134 (7th Cir. 
1996) (finding no excusable neglect where experienced attorney failed to follow rule). 
An indication of the high threshold for excusable neglect is contained in two cases 
discussed in Prowswood. In a Tenth Circuit case, the proffered excuse was the death of a 
senior partner who was responsible for the litigation and that the attorney making the 
motion had inherited voluminous matters as a result of the death. The attorney argued as a 
basis that "through inadvertence and preoccupation with other matters, he neglected to file 
the notice within the statutory period.53 Prowswood 676 P.2d at 960. The Tenth Circuit 
held that this did not show excusable neglect. Id. The Ninth Circuit likewise rejected an 
lSee also Gochis v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 16 F.3d 12,14 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding 
attorney's misinterpretation of appellate rule not excusable neglect); U.S. v. Vaccaro? 51 
F.3d 189,191 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Advanced Estimating System. Inc. v. Riney, 130 
F.3d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1997) (no excusable neglect where attorney thought he had more 
time to file Rule 59 motion which would have extended time to file notice of appeal). 
excuse that the attorney "had been preoccupied with a change of employment and had been 
unusually busy.33 Id. 
The facts must demonstrate something beyond a simple miscalculation or other error 
by counsel to support a finding of excusable neglect. The excuses advanced by the Serratos 
are neither unique nor extraordinary. The Serratos argued before the trial court that 
"plaintiffs3 counsel was excusably mistaken when he believed that August 31, 1999, was the 
date that judgment was entered.33 That conclusion is not supportable. 
NOTICE is hereby given pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure that the Summary Judgment and Order of 
Dismissal in the above-referenced matter was signed by the Honorable 
Stephen L. Henriod on August 26,1999, and has been filed. Please 
govern yourselves accordingly. 
(R. 252-53) The notice, service of which does not affect the running of the time for ' 
initiating an appeal, is unambiguous. Experienced counsel should know the provisions of 
the appellate rules and be on notice that the clock was ranning by the time the Rule 58A 
notice was received. 
There is no question that neglect was involved in Serratos3 failure to timely file their 
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notice of appeal. However, neglect alone is an insufficient basis for permitting an appeal 
after the 30-day period has run. Serratos3 proffered excuses do not reach the level of unique 
or extraordinary circumstances to satisfy the requirement of excusable neglect. Moreover, { 
the trial court made no findings of excusable neglect. Granting permission to commence an 
appeal under these circumstances is an abuse of discretion which simply converts the 30-day 
time period into 60 days. Because the trial court improperly extended the time for appeal, 
this Court lacks jurisdiction over Serratos5 appeal and it should be dismissed on that basis 
without even reaching the merits of their arguments. 
II. THE SERRATOS3 FAILURE TO SERVE THEIR NOTICE OF CLAIM 
ON UTA'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS BARS THEIR ACTION AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The Governmental Immunity Act requires the service of a notice of claim by any 
person having a claim against a governmental entity or its employees before initiating legal 
action. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (2).2 The act specifies the contents of the requisite 
notice and provides that it be "directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of § 63-30-12 or 63-30-13." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-11 (3)(b)(ii). For claims against a political subdivision or its employees, the notice 
of claim must be "filed with the governing body of the political subdivision . . ." within one 
year of the date the claim arises. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (emphasis added). 
UTA is a public transit district created pursuant to the Utah Public Transit District 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1001, etseq. By definition in the Governmental Immunity 
Act, a public transit district is a political subdivision. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(7). UTA 
is, therefore, a governmental entity and political subdivision of the State of Utah which is 
subject to the provisions of the Act. 
The powers of a transit district are performed by a board of directors. Utah Code 
Ann. § 17A-2-1038(l). That board of directors is the "legislative body of the district,53 
^ h e statutory provisions were amended in 1998. All citations in this brief are to the 
version of the Act which was in effect when Serratos' claims arose. 
1 ^ 
§ 17A-2-1039(l), and has power to pass ordinances and resolutions. § 17A-2-1039(8). 
The powers contained in § 17A-2-1039 expressly endow the Board of Directors with the 
authority to govern, making it the "governing body" for purposes of the filing of a notice of 
claim under the Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. 
Application of the various statutory notice provisions leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that a party having a claim against UTA must file a notice of claim complying 
with the statutory requirements with UTA's Board of Directors before maintaining an 
action and within one year from the date the claim arises. 
The Serratos give only passing lip service to the judicial doctrine of strict compliance 
with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act and proceed to argue that 
the rule should be construed flexibly where the governmental entity is otherwise on notice 
of a potential claim. They also argue that "[i]t is extremely difficult to discern from the 
statutes who is the UTA's governing body, let alone how to serve that body.53 They then 
proceed to argue that because no member of the UTA Board of Directors would have seen 
or read the notice, service on the Board as required by statute would be a futile act "which 
the law abhors." None of these arguments is persuasive under Utah law which requires that 
the notice of claim be served on the governing body, the UTA Board of Directors. 
Contrary to the Serratos5 arguments, it is not difficult to identify and serve a notice 
of claim on UTA5s governing body. Nor is it difficult to determine how to serve the 
governing body, the Board of Directors. This is illustrated by the simple fact that Serratos 
served their summons and complaint on the Board of Directors. (R. 5-7) The notice of 
claim was drafted and served by legal counsel who is qualified to research, understand and 
comply with the notice of claim requirements. Counsel was able to determine whom to 
serve with the summons and complaint and likewise should have been able to determine the 
proper service for the notice of claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistendy held that in the absence of a timely notice 
of claim the governmental entity is not afforded sufficient knowledge to evaluate and 
respond to the claim. Actual notice does not satisfy the requirement that a notice of claim 
be filed. Scott v. School Bd. of Granite School Dist.. 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977); Sears v. 
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977); Scarborough v. Granite School Dist.. 531 P.2d 
480 (Utah 1975); Edwards v. Iron County. 531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975); Varoz v. Sevey. 
506 P.2d 435 (Utah 1973). The "vast majority of courts have held that actual notice to the 
correct public entity, as opposed to actual service of the required written notice upon it, will 
not suffice." Frasier, Annotation: Persons or Entities Upon Whom Notice of Personal 
Injury or Claim Against State or State Agencies May or Must Be Served, 45 ALR5th 173 
§ 2[a] at 191 (1997). 
The controlling case with respect to the Serratos5 claims is Bellonio v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996). Though Serratos cite from Bellonio, their 
selective references to the opinion are superficial and fail to deal with the substance of that 
case. In Bellonio, the plaintiff had been injured at the Salt Lake International Airport and 
had served what were arguably notices of claim on the attorney for the airport, the Utah 
Attorney General, the Salt Lake City Attorney, and the Airport Director. The court in 
Bellonio determined that the airport was not a separate governmental entity, but was a 
division of Salt Lake City Corporation, and the governing body is the City Council. 
Arguably, this made service somewhat more complicated than it is here where UTA is a 
separate governmental entity created and identified by statute. 
The plaintiff in Bdlonio, like the Serratos, argued the sufficiency of (1) constructive 
notice to the governmental entity and (2) substantial compliance with the notice 
requirements. Applying well-established rules of statutory construction, the court 
determined that the term "governing body" was unambiguous and that the plain meaning 
of the statute dictated that plaintiffs failure to file the notice with the governing body 
barred his claims. Bellonio, 911 P.2d at 1296-97. The court also disagreed that the statute 
should be interpreted "in an equitable fashion." Reviewing excerpts from Bischel v. Merritt, 
907 P.2d 275 (Utah App.1995) and Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App.1994) 
which the Serratos also rely on for support, the Bellonio court noted that while those 
statements "may seem to indicate a flexible rule of constructive notice to governmental 
entities, this is not the general rule in this state." Bellonio 911 P.2d at 1297. The court 
went on to state that "Utah courts have typically required strict compliance with the notice 
of claim requirements except in very limited circumstances." Id. (emphasis added). See also 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36,1119, 977 P.2d 1201,1203 (requiring stria 
compliance and noting that c[a]ctual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet these 
requirements"). 
The court distinguished the Bellonio facts from its prior decisions in Bischel and 
Brittain where plaintifFs were permitted to proceed despite failure to strictly comply with 
the notice requirements. The court asserted that: 
the precedential effect of those cases is limited by their unique factual 
underpinnings and, therefore, neither should be construed as an 
indication that we are prepared to abrogate the long-standing rule 
requiring strict compliance with all aspects of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The court's analysis in distinguishing the two prior cases merits a verbatim review: 
In Brittain^ we determined that service of a notice of claim upon the 
attorney general and upon the State Division of Risk Management 
satisfied, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993), which requires service 
upon the attorney general and upon the "agency concerned." 882 P.2d 
at 672. Brittain^ however, is distinguishable from the present appeal 
in that it involved section 12 rather than section 13 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 
(1993) with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). Therefore, while 
this court found it reasonable to construe Risk Management as the 
"agency concerned" in section 12, it does not follow, a fortiori, that the 
Salt Lake City Attorney is the "governing body" of Salt Lake City in 
section 13. In fact, in contradistinction to section 12, section 13 
contains no indication that the City's legal counsel is entitled to any 
notice of claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). 
Section 13, unlike section 12, contemplates that a notice of claim is 
to be directed only to a political subdivision's governing body, not to 
its legal counsel. This interpretation is consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's earlier pronouncements that a primary purpose of the 
notice of claim is to "afford the responsible public authorities an 
opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits 
of a claim." Stahl, 618 P.2d at 482 (construing section 12) (emphasis 
added). 
Given our determination that section 13 requires service upon the 
mayor and the city council, this court's recent opinion in Bischel 
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requires some elucidation. In Bischel^ this court allowed a claim 
against Salt Lake County to proceed despite the fact that the notice of 
claim was, in fact, served upon the Salt Lake County Attorney, rather 
than upon the Salt Lake County Commission as dictated by section 
13. Bischel, 907 P.2d at 278. While Biscbel may, at first blush, appear 
to be controlling in this case, that opinion was based upon a unique 
set of facts which is absent in this appeal. 
In Bischcl^ the plaintiff was unsure of how to serve the county 
commission with a notice of claim; therefore, she did an entirely 
sensible thing and called the commission to ask for instructions. Id. 
She was instructed, by an agent of the commission, to serve her notice 
of claim upon the Salt Lake County Attorney. Id. On those facts, this 
court found that the plaintiff had complied with the statute, as 
misinterpreted for her by the county commission. Id. at 279. Thus, 
the end result in Bischd was not based upon a substantial compliance 
or constructive notice theory, but rather was founded upon the 
apparent agency of the commission employee. Id. at 278-79. The 
inequity of allowing the commission to base its defense upon its 
agent's misinformation prompted this court to utilize an estoppel-type 
argument to prevent the commission from forging the shield of 
governmental immunity into a sword. Id. at 279. 
Bellonio at 1297-98 (emphasis added). 
In analyzing Bnttain, it is important to underline the distinction between the broad 
language in § 63-30-12, requiring service on "the agency concerned," and the much more 
narrow and specific language in § 63-30-13, requiring service on "the governing body." 
For example, in Brittain it was rational for the court to apply the broad language to 
determine that the risk management division was, of the many state agencies, reasonably 
treated as an "agency concerned." It is impossible, however, to use the same analysis to find 
an alternative to "governing body" for purposes of serving UTA. UTA has, by law, only 
one governing body. 
Determining that the plaintiff had failed to serve the governing body, the Bellonio 
court barred his claims for failure to properly serve a notice of claim. Id. 911 P.2d at 1298. 
In Busch v. Salt Lake Infl Airport. 921 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1996), decided five 
months after Bellonio. the plaintiff had served notice of claim against the airport on the Salt 
Lake City Recorder and the Salt Lake City Attorney. He subsequently retained new 
counsel who served the U.S. Attorney, Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake 
City and the Salt Lake City Council. The court ruled that the first notice, served on the 
recorder and attorney, was insufficient under the statute, but that the second one was valid 
and was the notice which commenced the one-year period for filing of a complaint. Busch 
921P.2dat472. 
Another recent pronouncement by the Utah Supreme Court on the issue of service 
of a notice of claim is contained in Larson v. Park City Municipal Corp.? 955 P.2d 343 
(Utah 1998). In Larson, the plaintiff had served the city by following the procedures for 
service of process under Rule 4(e)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring service 
on the city recorder. The trial court dismissed the action because the plaintiff had not 
served the governing body. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that service upon the city 
recorder was sufficient for purposes of service of the notice of claim. The court discussed 
the close relationship between the recorder and the city council, both statutorily and as a 
practical reality, and concluded that a claimant could, regardless of the provisions of Rule 4, 
reasonably and logically conclude from the statutes that it was proper to serve the city 
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recorder. Larson 955 P.2d at 346. In discussing the elements leading to its conclusion, the 
court noted seven significant ties between the recorder and the council. 
In the case before us, Larson chose to file her notice of claim with 
the city recorder of Park City inasmuch as rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure designates that person for service of summons and 
complaint upon the city. A review of the Utah Municipal Code 
indeed reveals that the city recorder has such a significant relationship 
with the city council that one would be justified in filing notice of 
claim with the recorder. For example, the city recorder is appointed 
by the mayor with advice and consent of the city council. Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-916. The city recorder is required to be located at the 
place of the city council or somewhere convenient thereto. Id. 
§ 10-6-137. The city recorder is required to attend the meetings of 
the governing body and keep a record of the proceedings. Id. The 
journal of the proceedings of the governing body is kept at the office 
of the city recorder. Id. § 10-3-603. All ordinances must be deposited 
in the office of the city recorder before they take effect. Id. 
§ 10-3-711. Where a special meeting is required of the governing 
body, it is the responsibility of the city recorder to give notice to each 
member of the council personally or by leaving it at the member's 
place of abode. Id. § 10-3-502. Petitions for annexation, objections 
to those petitions, and amendments to those petitions are required to 
be filed with the city recorder. Id. § 10-2-403 (Supp. 1997). And 
when a lawsuit is filed against a city, the city entity is served by leaving 
a copy of the summons and complaint with the city recorder. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 4. 
Larson 955 P.2d at 346. 
The Larson holding does not apply to the Serratos3 notice. The analysis in Larson 
turned on whether, based on the service provisions of Rule 4 and upon statutory provisions 
dealing with municipal government, a party might reasonably believe that service of notice 
on the city recorder was proper. Based upon those statutory provisions, the court held that 
"the city recorder has such a significant relationship with the city council that one would be 
justified in filing the notice of claim with the recorder." Larson 955 P.2d at 346. 
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In stark contrast, the UTA Risk Manager, Steven H. Cain, and Claims Adjuster 
David C. Pitcher have no significant relationship with the UTA governing body and 
therefore do not satisfy any of the criteria identified in Larson so as to justify service of the 
notice of claim upon them. Moreover, there is no conflict between the requirement for 
service on UTA3s governing body and any provision of Rule 4. There are also no statutory 
provisions establishing any, much less a significant relationship between UTA's risk 
manager or claims adjuster. Neither Steven H. Cain nor David C. Pitcher (1) is an officer 
of UTA, (2) is a member of UTA3s Board of Directors, or (3) reports directly to the Board. 
(R. 24-27) Moreover, Mr. Cain is effectively four levels removed from being an "executive 
employee" or closely tied to the board of directors. His immediate supervisor is 
Kenneth D. Montague, Jr., the Director of Finance. Mr. Montague in turn reports to the 
General Manager, John M. Inglish, who in turn reports to the board of directors. (R. 146) 
Mr. Pitcher is one level further removed from the Board. Serratos5 claims, therefore, are not 
based upon any of the independent, objective indications in Larson. There is no reasonable, 
objective basis for an individual to assume that Mr. Cain or Mr. Pitcher had the type of 
"significant relationship33 with the governing body which was the basis of the Larson 
decision. 
The Serratos argument, to the effect that service of the notice of claim upon Cain 
and Pitcher satisfies the purposes underlying the notice requirements, is in direct conflict 
with the historical judicial requirement for strict compliance with the notice requirements. 
This argument was rejected by this Court in Lamarr v. Dept. of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 
91 
540-41 (Utah App. 1992) (holding strict compliance with notice of claim provisions to be 
jurisdictional). Serratos3 claim arises solely from a statutory waiver of governmental 
immunity. As noted by the Bellonio court, "where a cause of action is based upon a statute, 
full compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a 
suit.53 Bellonio 911 P.2d at 1297 (citing Scarborough v. Granite School Dist.T 531 P.2d 
480, 482 (Utah 1975)). Absent particularly unique circumstances, which are not present 
here, strict compliance with the service of notice requirements is mandated by law. 
Stahl v. Utah Transit Audu 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) is neither applicable nor 
helpful in this matter. Stahl dealt with service of a notice under provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 11-20-56, the former Utah Public Transportation Act, which was subsequently 
repealed and does not have a current replacement. Stahl might apply if § 11-20-56 
governed the notice at issue here. The governing statute, however, is § 63-30-13, therefore 
Stahl is inapplicable. Also, the Stahl court specifically excluded the Governmental 
Immunity Act from its holding, noting that, unlike the Public Transportation Act, cc[t]he 
Governmental Immunity Act makes clear that a failure to comply with the notice provision 
results in a bar to prosecution of the action.35 Stahl at 481. Despite Serratos3 argument that 
the equitable principles set forth in Stahl should control, § 63-30-13 is not interpreted ccin 
an equitable fashion.53 Bellonio 911 P.2d at 1297. 
Serratos also argue that because they were "advised by someone at the UTA33 that 
Mr. Cain was authorized to accept their notice, the Bischel holding controls here. The 
equitable basis for the holding in BischeL however, is lacking here. In BischeL the plaintiffs 
attorney contacted the office of the County Commission and was specifically advised that 
the notice should be served on a named individual at the County Attorney's office. The 
attorney did not call "someone" at the county offices, but contacted a Commission 
employee. The Serratos did not speak with an employee of the Board. Moreover, the 
attorney in Bischel took the second step of contacting the designated deputy county 
attorney who confirmed that she was the proper person upon whom to serve the notice. 
Serratos did not contact Mr. Cain or Mr. Pitcher to verify that they were authorized by the 
Board to accept service of a notice of claim. As noted by this Court in BeUomo, the 
precedential effect of Bischel is "limited by [its] unique factual underpinnings." Bellonio 
911 P.2d at 1297. The facts surrounding the Serratos3 service of notice do not fall within 
those unique factual underpinnings. Moreover, "[a]s a general rule, estoppel may not be 
invoked against a governmental entity. Anderson v. Public Service Comm3n? 839 P.2d 822, 
827 (Utah 1992). An estoppel claim against a governmental entity generally requires 
"specific written representations by authorized government entities.55 Id. 
Nor do Serratos3 other case authorities support their arguments. In Tohnson v. City 
of Bountiful, 996 F.Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998), the city advised the plaintiff on two 
separate occasions that he would be fully compensated. Tohnson 996 F.Supp. at 1103. On 
the basis of these representations and the plaintiffs reliance on them, the court estopped the 
city from relying on the notice of claim defense. Neither Cain nor Pitcher made this type of 
affirmative representation to Serratos. Rice v. Granite School Dist. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 
1969) involved a statute of limitation defense where there was an issue of fact whether the 
district's agent induced the plaintiff to delay filing his lawsuit until after the statute had run. 
Those facts do not apply here and the governmental immunity defense was not at issue in 
Rice. 
The Serratos also argue that the notice of claim may be filed by mail and that a 
notice directed to the Board of Directors would never have come to the attention of the 
Board. Both of these arguments are addressed by application of the rules of statutory 
construction to the governing statutes. The Serratos further suggest that their notice of 
claim is valid because the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1 for mailing of notice 
"shall be deemed filed35 and "received35 when mailed. This construction of the mailing 
provisions has no support. The rules of statutory construction require that statutes "be so 
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and . . . interpretations are 
to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.35 Perrine v. 
KennecottMin. Corp., 911 P.2d 1290,1292 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). If there is 
any question as to the meaning or application of statutory provisions, the court must 
analyze the provisions in their entirety and "harmonize [the] provisions in accordance with 
the legislative intent and purpose.55 CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm5n? 897 
P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1996). If there appears to be a conflict between provisions of the 
same act, the court must harmonize those provisions. Madsen v. BrownT 701 P.2d 1086, 
1089-90 (Utah 1985). In addition, "a provision treating a matter specifically prevails over 
an incidental reference made thereto in a provision treating another issue . . . because the 
legislative mind is presumed to have stated its intent when it focused on the particular 
issue.35 Id. 701 P.2d at 1090. 
The Serratos3 proposed interpretation of § 63-37-1 fails under all of these rules. The 
legislative intent in enacting the notice provisions was to limit the scope of the waiver of 
sovereign immunity by requiring strict compliance with the statutory notice requirements. 
If we accept Serratos3 construction, (1) the notice provisions are significantly broadened, 
and (2) the specific provisions of §§ 63-30-11 and -13 become surplusage, a result to be 
avoided in construing statutes. Moreover, the provisions of §§ 63-30-11 and -13 are more 
specific whereas the provisions of § 63-37-1 are merely an incidental alternative for filing 
the proper notice of claim. The logical and correct construction of these statutes is that 
§ 63-37-1 provides only an alternative to personal service as a means of filing a notice of 
claim which otherwise meets all of the requirements of §§ 63-30-11 and -13. If the notice 
fails to meet the specific statutory requirements, e.g., service on the governing body, those 
failings cannot be cured by simply mailing the notice to a UTA employee. Such a 
construction would lead to an absurd result. 
As a practical matter, to accept the Serratos3 argument would render meaningless all 
of the service requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. Mailing of a notice to 
someone at UTA other than the Board of Directors, fails to satisfy the notice requirements. 
In arguing otherwise, the Serratos seek to have this Court engage in judicial legislation to 
alter the plain and unambiguous meaning of §§ 63-30-11 and -13. In essence, they argue 
that if a plaintiflF improperly files a notice of claim and he can, by investigation or discovery, 
determine that the governing body is minimally or not direcdy involved in handling, 
litigating or settling claims, it is appropriate for the plaintiff to serve someone other than the 
person or entity required by the unambiguous provisions of the statute.3 In any instance 
where a governmental entity has designated an individual for the handling of claims, a 
plaintiff would need only to serve that individual, contrary to the express provisions of the 
Act. For example, where a claim involves UDOT, the current provision requires service 
upon the Attorney General, who will not actually be involved with the case until a 
complaint is filed. A plaintiff could merely serve the UDOT claims adjuster who was 
reviewing the claim and avoid service on the Attorney General, in direct contradiction of the 
express requirement of the statute. 
In other words, Serratos encourage the Court to change the standard fixed by the 
legislature to a flexible one, judicially imposed according to the facts and circumstances of 
each case. Such a result is unsupported by law and is constitutionally prohibited. This 
Court has no authority to strike down the legislatively imposed conditions on waivers of 
governmental immunity. The Court should decline Serratos3 invitation to judicially amend 
the legislative enactment. 
The Serratos3 futility argument is spurious at best as is demonstrated by their case 
authorities. Roundy v. Staley. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 229, 984 P.2d 404 dealt with the 
3We note that delegation of authority by the UTA Board, regardless of the extent of 
that delegation, is also a constitutionally impermissible way of altering the legislatively-
enacted statute. UTA can no more change the applicable statutory language than can the 
Serratos or the Court. 
futility of objecting to presentation of evidence where the issue had been previously 
preserved by moving to have the evidence produced to plaintiff. Futility of an action was 
discussed in Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892 (Utah App. 1996) only in the dissenting 
opinion and is not controlling law. Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah App. 
1989) dealt with tender of performance in a contracts case and found that tender in that 
instance was not futile. None of these cases support the argument that strict compliance 
with a statute which is jurisdictional to a cause of action may be avoided as futile. 
The Serratos here have failed to serve the statutorily required notice of claim upon 
the UTA Board of Directors. As noted in Bellonio, the statutes are clear that service must 
be upon the Board. Bellonio also confirms that Serratos3 service upon the Utah Attorney 
General does not satisfy the notice requirement. Nor does service upon UTA's Risk 
Manager or Claims Adjuster. Neither of these individuals has a close or significant 
relationship with the Board as was the case in Larson. 
Because the Serratos failed to satisfy the notice of claim provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, the trial court correcdy granted summary judgment and 
dismissed their claims. This Court should affirm that judgment. 
IIL THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE SERRATOS5 
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS. THE UTAH 
SAVINGS STATUTE THEREFORE DOES NOT PERMIT THE 
SERRATOS TO RE-FILE THEIR NOTICE OF CLAIM AND THEIR 
COMPLAINT. 
The Serratos argue that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 apply to 
permit them to cure the jurisdictional deficiency in their action by filing a new notice of 
claim and complaint within one year after dismissal of the present action. That argument is 
unsupported by Utah law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 permits refiling of a timely commenced action within 
one year of dismissal of the original action "otherwise than upon the merits." The statute 
does not provide for a renewed period within which to file a notice of claim. Even if the 
savings statute applied to dismissal of the Serratos3 claims, their re-filed action would be 
subject to the same failings-failure to file a proper notice of claim before expiration of the 
notice period. 
The Serratos seek support in Madsen v. Borthick 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) 
("Madsen F ) and Madsen v. BorthicL 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988^ ("Madsen IP) , appeal 
after remand, 850 P.2d 442 (Utah 1993). They fail, however, to recognize a significant 
distinction between these Madsen cases and their own action. Madsen I affirmed the trial 
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs3 claims for failure to satisfy the notice of claim 
requirements. In Madsen n ? "in an apparent attempt to avoid the notice requirement and 
its then-expired time limit35 the plaintiffs did not sue the defendants in their official 
capacities. Madsen II 769 P.2d at 247.4 This is distinction is not only significant but 
controlling. The action against the defendants was in their individual capacities and stated 
claims of gross negligence for which they were not immune under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Id. The Supreme Court held in Madsen II that res judicata did not apply 
^ h e plaintiffs in Madsen II did not attempt to file a notice of claim and the court 
did not direcdy address the issue of whether they could do so. 
because the claims being alleged were not the same as the claims to which the notice 
provisions were applicable. In other words, the court did not resurrect the expired notice of 
claim period. 
The filing of a notice of claim is not only a precondition to commencement of an 
action, e.g., Madsen II at 254, but also cc[t]he notice of claim provisions of §§ 63-30-11 and 
63-30-13 operate as a one-year statute of limitations in cases brought against a 
governmental entity.53 Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992). 
See also Bullock v. Dept. ofTransp.. 966 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Utah App. 1998) (holding 
claim against State to be time-barred for failing to file timely notice of claim); Nielson v. 
Gurley, 888 P.2d 130,134 (Utah App. 1994) ("Failure to comply with the notice 
provisions of the Act deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.") 
The Serratos5 claims are clearly distinguishable from those in Foil v. Ballings 601 
P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) on which they also rely. In Foil the medical malpractice notice 
requirement was not a statute of limitation and did not have the effect of barring an action. 
McGuire v. Univ. of Utah Medical Center. 603 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1979). The result is 
not the same where the notice provision is a statute of limitation. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the distinction between notice required under 
the medical malpractice act and notice under the Governmental Immunity Act in Standard 
Federal Sav. 8c Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1128 (Utah 1991). Noting that a 
claim against a governmental entity is barred under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 where the 
notice requirement is not met, the court stated that cc[i]n the absence of such a plain 
oo 
expression of intent, we have generally read statutes that impose preconditions to filing suit 
as establishing only procedural hurdles to suit, hurdles that can be cleared, rather than 
absolute bars to suit." Kirkbride 821 P.2d at 1138. Citing Foil, the court recognized the 
notice provision of the medical malpractice act as falling within the latter category. Id. In 
C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime Victim's Reparations. 966 P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah App. 
1998), this Court recognized the Kirkbride discussion of the governmental immunity notice 
provisions as "an example of when the Legislature has provided a definite and finite time 
period for filing that would preclude application of the general 'savings statute.333 C.P. 966 
P.2d at 1226 n. 2 (emphasis added). 
Consistent with these cases is Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 
(Utah 1980) in which the court found that claims against defendants dismissed for failure ( 
to comply with the notice requirements of the medical malpractice act were covered by the 
savings provisions of § 78-12-40 and the claims against the governmental defendants 
covered by the Governmental Immunity Act were different, affirming the trial court's 
dismissal of these latter claims with prejudice. Yates 617 P.2d at 354. 
i 
Contrary to the Serratos3 argument, their action was not "commenced within due 
time33 as required by § 78-12-40 because it was commenced after the running of the one-
year statute of limitation in the Governmental Immunity Act. Failure to strictly comply ( 
with the notice requirements, including the one-year limitation period, bars claims against a 
governmental entity. There is, in other words, no action to save under § 78-12-40 and the 
trial court properly dismissed the Serratos3 claims with prejudice. This Court should 
therefore affirm that dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Serratos failed to commence their appeal within the requisite 30-day period and 
the trial court's grant of an extension of time to appeal, absent a showing of excusable 
neglect, was a reversible abuse of discretion. Because the appeal was not timely 
commenced, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal and it must be dismissed. 
Even if the Court examines the merits of the Serratos3 appeal, the trial court's legal 
conclusions are correct under Utah law. The Serratos3 failure to timely and correctly file 
their notice of claim bars their claims against UTA as a matter of law. There are no 
equitable or other grounds for this Court to find otherwise, so it should affirm the trial 
courts summary judgment ruling. Because failure to comply with the notice of claim 
requirements precludes application of the savings statute, the trial court also correctly 
dismissed the Serratos3 claims with prejudice. This Court should also affirm that dismissal. 
JU 
DATED this ^>_ day of May, 2000. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
^ |(*v4h-
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December 2, 1997 
NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR INJURY 
Steven Cain, Risk Manager 
Utah Transit Authority 
3600 South 700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General of the State of Utah 
23 6 South Capital Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
David C. Pitcher, AIC 
Utah Transit Authority 
3600 South 700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
BY PERSONAL SERVICE 
BY PERSONAL SERVICE 
BY PERSONAL SERVICE 
RE: My Clients: 
Date of Injury: 
Cristobal and Elida Serrato 
12/17/96 
Dear Ms. Graham and Messrs. Cain and Pitcher: 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§63-30-11, et sea. , (1995), as 
amended, you are hereby put on notice that my clients, Cristobal 
and Elida Serrato, have a claim for injury against the Utah Transit 
Authority and Lance K. Sargent, the driver of one of it!s buses, 
for personal injuries arising out of an automobile/bus collision on 
or about December 17, 1996. This claim arises from the following 
facts. 
A BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS; THE NATURE 
OF THE CLAIM ASSERTED; AND, THE DAMAGES 
INCURRED BY THE CLAIMANTS SO FAR 
AS THEY ARE KNOWN 
On December 17, 1996, at approximately 6:40 am, Cristobal Serrato 
was driving his truck eastbound on 4715 South, on his way to work. 
Elida, Cristobal's wife, was riding with him. At the intersection 
of 4420 West and 4715 South, a UTA bus turned left in front of my 
client's vehicle. 
for failing The driver of the UTA bus, Mr. Sargent, was negligent 
to keep a proper lookout, failure to yield the xri^JKSs. {^^^^f^Ml^y 
LrQEC—H.UU iiii 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Cristobal and Elida Serrato 
December 2, 1997 
Page 2 
dangerous left hand turn and failure to obey a traffic control 
device. As a result of the negligence of the driver of the bus, my 
clients have suffered serious personal injuries. 
As a result of the collision, Cristobal Serrato has sustained 
injuries to his neck, back and shoulders. Mr. Serrato has incurred 
medical expenses, lost wages and will likely incur future medical 
expenses related to the injuries suffered in this incident. 
My client Elida Serrato has sustained injuries to her face, head, 
and back, including multiple lacerations about her neck and face 
and broken teeth. Mrs. Serrato has incurred medical expenses, lost 
wages and will likely incur future medical expenses related to the 
injures suffered in this incident. Furthermore, Mrs. Serrato 
appears to have symptoms consistent with a closed-head injury. 
As a result of the negligence of the bus driver, my clients have 
suffered mental and physical pain and suffering, inconvenience and 
interference with the normal activities of daily living apart from 
gainful employment. 
Neither Cristobal nor Elida Serrato are under the age of majority 
or mentally incompetent. 
Sincerely, 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
Steven R. Paul 
Attorney for Claimants 
SRP/sp 
ADDENDUM A-2 
JODY K. BURNETT (A0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defandants 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRISTOBAL SERRATO and ELIDA 
SERRATO, 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and LANCE K. 
SARGENT, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN H. CAIN 
Civil No. 980903929PI 
Judge Judith Atherton 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the Risk Manager for the Utah Transit Authority and have held that position 
and job title since December 9,1996. 
2. In summary, my responsibilities include design, implementation and 
administration of UTA's Risk Management Programs including risk identification, evaluation, 
control, financing, insurance programs, claims administration, safety, and security programs. 
3. My supervisor is the Director of Finance, Kenneth D. Montague, Jr. 
4. I am not an officer of UTA. 
5. I am not a member of the Board of Directors of UTA or an executive employee or 
secretary to the Board of Directors. 
6. I am not a registered agent of UTA authorized to receive service of process on its 
behalf. 
7. I was not hired by the Board of Directors of UTA and do not report to the Board 
of Directors. 
8. It is not part of my job responsibilities to attend Board of Director's meetings and 
I do not routinely do so. 
9. I do not keep any minutes or records of the Board of Directors. 
10. I am not involved in providing notice of Board of Directors meetings. 
DATED this / — day of ZJmy 
_, 1998. 
Steven H. Cain 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J_ day of 
^ NOTARY PUBLIC 
3600 South 700 W**t 
_ S.LC.VUT 84115 
if#Ki 
STATE Of UTAH | 
«E (0*-y*~' 
j 
Notary Public 
Residing in: ^L (L. 
., 1998. 
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ADDENDUM A-3 
JODY K. BURNETT (A0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defandants 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRISTOBAL SERRATO and ELIDA : 
SERRATO, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
V. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and LANCE K. 
SARGENT, 
. Defendants. _ _ 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DAVID C. PITCHER 
Civil No. 980903929PI 
Judge Judith Atherton 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the claims adjustor for the Utah Transit Authority and have held that position 
and job title since May, 1996. 
2. In summary, my responsibilities include the supervision and handling of all 
claims, recovery, and litigation for which UTA is self insured. I am also responsible for assisting 
the Risk Manager in the evaluation and purchase of insurance, as well as training employees and 
consulting with other departments on claims and recovery related issues. 
3. My supervisor is the Risk Manager, Steven A. Cain. 
4. I am not an officer of UTA. 
5. I am not a member of the Board of Directors of UTA or an executive employee or 
secretary to the Board of Directors. 
6. I am not a registered agent of UTA authorized to receive service of process on its 
behalf. 
7. I was not hired by the Board of Directors of UTA and do not report to the Board 
of Directors. 
8. It is not part of my job responsibilities to attend Board of Director's meetings and 
I do not routinely do so. 
9. I do not keep any minutes or records of the Board of Directors. 
10. I am not involved in providing notice of Board of Directors meetings. 
DATED this 1 day of C T o l ^ , 1998. 
avid C. Pitcher 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / 
^ NOTARY PUBLIC 
DIANNE8UECURUEY 
3600 SoiA? mo West 
J5.LC.tr! 34-15 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
NOV 15,2001 
STATE OF UTAH 
^ju*~\J~ 
Notary Public 
Residing in: c p Z -
ADDENDUM A-4 
JODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRISTOBAL SERRATO and ELIDA 
SERRATO, 
Plaintiffs, 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
LANCE K. SARGENT, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 980903929PI 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
NOTICE is hereby given pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that the Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal in die above-referenced 
matter was signed by the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod on August 26, 1999, and has 
been filed. Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this ?l day of August. 1999. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By 
Jody 
Attorrfe/s for Defendants 
fy^w^CT 
74778.1 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Beverly Riemann, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in die law offices of 
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendants herein; that she served the attached NOTICE 
OF ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL in 
Case No. 980903929PI before the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, upon die parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy diereof in an 
envelope addressed to: 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
G. Eric Nielson 
Steven R. Paul 
BERTCH& BIRCH 
5296 S. Commerce Drive, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
and causing die same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on die 31st day of 
August, 1999. 
^ yjuJU. r L > & " V ' 1 ^V~\r 
Beverly Riemtfnn 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 31st day of August, 1999. 
rwmm •MyR*1 -mw ^ 
MARY C WARDfLL I 
^MUNtOte Utah 84111 I tattUtoCtoUta %CemmWon 
*«7.2000 | 
*5»ofUt* • 
• • • • • J 
ADDENDUM A-5 
G. Eric Nielson (#5327) 
BERTCH & BIRCH, L.C. 
Commerce Center, Suite 100 
5296 South 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-5300 
Facsimile: (801) 262-2111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CRISTOBAL SERRATO and ELIDA ) 
SERRATO, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and : 
LANCE K. SARGENT, ; 
Defendants. 
) ORDER RE: MOTION TO EXTEND 
I TIME TO APPEAL 
) Civil No. 980903929 PI 
) Judge Henriod 
) 
The Court, having considered plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Time to Appeal, and good 
cause appearing therefore, said request is granted. 
HUD DISTRICT mm 
* Third Judicial Distnct 
m-*Z 
Dated this y day of November, 1999. 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
> / - i" 
i' r~- • 
Judge Henriod 
^ ^ V / T T -
Jody ffl Burne 
/Attorney for Defendants 
. ^ ^ 
G. Eric Nielson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
» 
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